

Message Text

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EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, TW, UR

SUBJ: NCNA MAN DISCUSSES CHIANG CHING KUO,
FUTURE OF TAIWAN, AND SOVIET THREAT

SUMMARY: NCNA OFFICIAL IN RECENT CONVERSATION APPEARED
ACCEPT VIEW THAT CHIANG CHING- KUO IS " CHINESE PATRIOT" WHO
CAN BE TRUSTED TO KEEP TAIWAN CHINESE; HE ENDORSED CONCEPT
OF GENERAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TAIPEI AND PEKING THAT TAIWAN
IS CHINESE PROVINCE, THAT IT WILL EVENTUALLY BE REUNITED WITH
MAINLAND " WHEN TIME IS RIPE", AND THAT USE OF FORCE IS RULED
OUT IN INTERIM. HE SAW SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE CONDEMNATION OF
HEGEMONY AS DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WITH TAIWAN,
AND THUS AS WARNING TO TAIWANESE THAT RESPONSE TO SOVIET
OVERTURES WOULD RISK AMERICAN DISPLEASURE. MAIN SOVIET THREAT
TO CHINESE SECURITY, HE SEEMED TO FEEL, WAS ALONG LAND BORDER,
INCLUDING THREAT TO TIBET, SINKIANG, ETC. END SUMMARY

1. AT A SMALL GATHERING AT MY HOUSE FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF PEKING
LIAISON OFFICE JENKINS ON APRIL 4, NCNA VICE CHIEF EDOTIR TAN
KAN MENTIONED RECENT REPORTS THAT CHIANG KAI- SHEK IS AT DEATH' S
DOOR, AND ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT CHIANG CHING- KUO. WHEN I
SAID CCK SEEMED TO ME A SINCERE CHINESE PATRIOT, TAN AGREED,
SAYING THAT CCK DOUBTLESS WAS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HISTORY WOULD
SAY OF HIM; AND, TAN REMARKED, " TRAITORS ARE CONSIDERED BY
CHINESE THE WORST OF ALL CRIMINALS". I SAID THERE HAD BEEN VARIOUS
INNUENDOS RELATED TO THE RUSSIAN ORIGIN OF CCK' S WIFE, BUT KNOWING
BOTH OF THEM I COULD SAY THAT THESE MISAPPREHENSIONS WERE
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BASELESS. I DID NOT KNOW HOW CCK SAW THE LONG- RUN FUTURE OF TAIWAN, BUT I DID FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE ONCE- COMMON WILD ALLEGATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT IF EVEN HE SUCCEEDED HIS FATHER HE WOULD TURN THE ISLAND OVER TO THE RUSSIANS-- OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO PEKING, WERE COMPLETELY FALSE. I THOUGHT HE WOULD BE LOYAL BOTH TO HIS FATHER AND TO CHINA.

2. TAN WENT ON TO ASK HOW I VIEWED THE LONGER- RUN FUTURE OF TAIWAN. I SAID THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A CONSENSUS AMONG THE CHINESE THERE THAT TAIWAN WAS AND SHOULD REMAIN A PROVINCE OF CHINA, AND THAT THIS APPLIED EVEN TO THE " TAIWANESE", OR " PEN- SHENG- JEN" (LITERALLY, " PEOPLE OF THIS PROVINCE"). THEY WOULD PROBABLY ALSO COME TO AGREE THAT SOME DAY, WHEN BOTH SIDES FELT THAT " THE TIME WAS RIPE", TAIWAN COULD BE POLITICALLY REUNITED WITH THE MAINLAND. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY WOULD HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE. I SAID I ASSUMED THE PRC SAW THE FUTURE IN SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TERMS, AND TAN AGREED (IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT MUCH CAN BE READ INTO TAN' S ASSENT ON THIS POINT).

3. TAN REFERRED TO THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE' S CONDEMNATION OF HEGEMONY, AND SAID THAT THIS SHOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN MAKING IT CLEAR TO ALL ELEMENTS IN TAIWAN THAT ANY INTRIGUES WITH THE USSR WOULD NOT ONLY ANGER THE PRC BUT ALSO JEOPARDIZE AMERICAN GOODWILL. TAN THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CAUSE SERIOUS TROUBLE IN TAIWAN; HE THOUGHT THE BIGGER THREAT WAS ON THE LAND BORDER. I ASKED IF HE HAD REFERENCE TO TIBET, SINKIANG, AND THAT AREA OF BORDER, AS WELL AS FURTHER NORTH, AND HE SAID THE SOVIETS COULD TRY TO MAKE TROUBLE IN VARIOUS WAYS ALL ALONG THE BORDER.

4. AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH, TAN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN ABOUT CAMBODIA. WAS IT OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD NOT SPOKEN AUTHORITATIVELY ON THE SUBJECT RECENTLY? WHY DID THE U. S. REJECT SIHANOUK? WHAT WERE OUR PURPOSES IN BOMBING, ETC. ETC.? I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE PEOPLE IN CAMBODIA WERE THE ONES WHO HAD REJECTED SIHANOUK. IF ALL THE CAMBODIANS WERE IN FACT IN FAVOR OF SIHANOUK OR HIS PROPOSITIONS, THEN THE U. S. WOULD PROBABLY NOT STAND IN THE WAY. WE WERE, AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, INTERESTED ONLY IN HELPING BRING ABOUT A REAL CEASEFIRE. OUR DISCUSSION ENDED AMICABLY, WITH TAN AGREEING THAT NEITHER OF US HAD FIRSTHAND INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT.

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